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IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO DECLINE 
TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE SURETIES CLAIM WHEN THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY ACTUAL DAMAGE WAS INCURRED 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the sureties claim based on 
the absence of a showing that they had paid any claims under the FMC Bond. 
Patricia Hayes & Assocs. v. Cammell Laird Holdings U.K. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
339 F.3d 76 
(Decided August, 5, 2003) 
Appellant-interveners Greenwich Insurance Co. and NAC Insurance Co. 
("sureties") appealed an order by the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York denying their motion to intervene. Accompanying the sureties 
motion to intervene were allegations that they had maritime liens against Big Red Boat II 
("BRBII"), which entitled them to enforce those liens in rem against BRBII. 
Patricia Hayes & Associates, Inc. ("Hayes") and Smithall Electronics, Inc. 
("Smithall") filed complaints against the BRBII, International Shipping Partners ("ISP"), 
Premier Cruises, Inc. ("Premier") and the Master of the BRBII (collectively "the 
defendants") alleging that they were entitled to an arrest warrant for the BRBII because 
of maritime liens held against the vessel. On September 15, 2000, Southern Marine 
Electric Company ("Southern Marine") and Alpha Marine ("Alpha Marine") filed similar 
complaints against the defendants. The district court signed the arrest warrants pursuant 
to Supplemental Rule C of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on September 15, 2000. 
When BRBII entered the district on Saturday, September 16, 2000, it was seized by 
United States Marshals. Following the arrest of the BRBII, the sureties filed their motion 
to intervene. The district court signed an order consolidating all claims filed against the 
defendants on September 28, 2000 and granted all motions to intervene regarding all 
uncontested claims. Once the majority of claims against BRBII were settled, the vessel 
was released from arrest on November 10, 2000. 
The claims raised by the sureties are related to a bond they issued to Premier. 
Although Premier did not own the BRBJI, the vessel had been chartered from its owners 
and operated by Premier as a part of its fleet. Procedurally, Premier is legally required to 
prove financial ability to refund any unearned passenger deposits before a carrier can 
transport passengers for hire from U.S. ports. In order to meet this requirement, Premier 
had the sureties post a Federal Maritime Commission Passenger Vessel Surety Bond 
("FMC Bond"), which covered Premier's entire fleet of six vessels. Coverage was 
limited to $5 million per vessel and $ 15 million collectively. The consideration for the 
FMC Bond was an agreement by Premier to pay a premium and indemnify the sureties 
for all "losses, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees." 
At the time Premier ceased operations in the fall of 2000, there remained 
outstanding passenger ticket deposits for the BRBII's future trips in the amount of 
$2,31 0,028.44. In addition, due to the cancellation of several summer 2000 voyages by 
BRBII, the sureties claimed that they were exposed to total potential liability of $5 
10 
million. However, the sureties never actually paid any claims under the FMC Bond. 
Although the primary issue the parties referred to in their briefs was whether an FMC 
Bond constitutes a maritime contract and whether a maritime lien can attach to a party 
pursuant to payments under the FMC Bond, the Court of Appeals found that the present 
case did not require the court to reach those issues because the sureties' motion to 
intervene and ensuing filings did not allege that they had made any payment under the 
FMC Bond. 
The court established that in order to intervene as of right, "the applicant must: ( 1) 
file a timely motion; (2) show an interest in the litigation; (3) show that its interests may 
be impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) show that its interest is not 
adequately protected by the parties to the action." In re Holocaust Victim Assets 
Litigation, 225 F.3d 19 1, 197 (2d Cir. 2000). A maritime lien is "a special property right 
in the vessel. . .  as security for a debt or claim ... [which] arises when the debt arises and 
grants the creditor the right to seize the vessel, have it sold, and be repaid the debt from 
the proceeds." !tel Containers lnt'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd. , 982 F.2d 765 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
In the present action, the sureties argue that amounts due under the FMC Bond 
entitle them to maritime liens against the BRBII. In addition, the sureties argue that 
passengers who had paid for a trip on the BRBII but did not redeem it were thereby given 
the right to maritime liens against the BRBII and those sureties, as payors of those 
claims, were thereby subrogated to those liens. However, the court found that the 
sureties' claims could not become ripe so as to justify granting a maritime lien against 
BRBII until there were amounts due under the FMC Bond. Contrary to the sureties' 
claims, the court repeatedly established that there was no money owed, nor had there 
been any amounts paid by the sureties under the FMC Bond that would thereby give rise 
to a maritime lien against the BRBII. Therefore, the court found no error in the district 
court's finding that the sureties' claims were not ripe. 
The sureties additionally relied upon Greenwich Marine, Inc. v. S.S. Alexandra, 
339 F.2d 90 1 (2d Cir. 1965) and The Lassell, 193 F. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1912) to assert that a 
maritime claim can be filed prior to a breach of a maritime contract if the potential breach 
of contract is apparent. The court struck down this argument, clarifying that the cited 
cases only establish that a district court has the discretion to proceed on a premature 
claim. In denying the sureties motion to intervene, the district court noted that the 
sureties had not yet paid any claims amounts on the bond, and that the sureties were 
holding $3.7 million in cash collateral for any potential claims to be paid. These factors 
established there was no abuse of discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction. The 
court instead concluded that the lack of payments by sureties proves that their claims 
against the BRBII were dubious and therefore unable to be adjudicated. For the forgoing 
reasons the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 
to deny the sureties' motion to intervene. 
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